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Abstract: Mark Rowlands’s target article offers a lucid, systematic treatment of a notion of
personhood that has had significant influence in philosophy. The orthodox interpretation of this
notion of personhood has been that it requires cognitive capacities not possessed by animals.
Rowlands disputes this. However, I think his objections to the orthodox, higher-order thought
(HOT) theories of mental unity may be too quick. In this commentary, I show two separable places
where Rowlands’s objection to HOT theories of mental unity falls short.
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1. Introduction
Metaphysical personhood is typically understood as meeting two conditions: (1) a mental life that
is (2) unified. The orthodox view in Western analytic philosophy has long been that non-human
animals fail to meet one or both of these conditions. Given scientific advances in our
understanding of non-human animal minds, the contemporary orthodoxy is that non-human
animals fail the second condition: mental unity. The orthodox view is that mental unity requires
meta-cognition, a capacity probably not possessed by non-human animals. More specifically,
mental unity is taken to require reflective self-awareness, which involves taking one’s own body,
actions, or mental states as the objects of intentional higher-order thoughts (HOTs). Because
personhood requires mental unity, and mental unity requires HOTs, non-human animals are not
persons.
Rowlands rejects the orthodox view just rehearsed. Rowlands has written effectively against
theories that appeal to HOTs, characterizing them as being motivated by “magical thinking” or as
relying on the “miracle-of-the-meta.”i In the case of appealing to HOTs to account for mental
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unity, Rowlands (2016) writes, “Not only is reflective self-awareness unnecessary for personhood,
it can, in fact, never be the basis of personhood” (p. 12).
In this commentary, I offer two distinct arguments suggesting that Rowlands’s objection to HOT
theories of mental unity is unsuccessful.
2. Rowlands’s Argument
Rowlands’s objection to the orthodox appeal to HOTs to account for mental unity runs as follows.
Accounting for the unity of a series of first-order thoughts by appealing to a second-order thought
simply pushes the matter back by introducing the question of how that second-order thought is
unified with the first-order thoughts.ii The obvious way to account for the unity of a given secondorder thought with the first-order thoughts it allegedly unifies is to appeal to the fact that the
former is about each of the latter. But Rowlands argues that this cannot work, because it
presupposes precisely the unity for which it is intended to account.
To illustrate his objection, Rowlands introduces a series of first-order thoughts, a1, a2, a3, … an,
which he calls the A-series, and a second series of first-order thoughts that he refers to as the Bseries. It could be that both series belong to the same thinker or that they belong to two different
thinkers. On the theory under consideration, a given HOT unifies and is unified with the A-series
and not with the B-series because it is about the A-series and not about the B-series. Rowlands
(2016) objects to this, writing, “The claim that [the HOT] is about members of the A series and not
the B series presupposes that A and B series are distinct series of mental states and processes”
(p. 14). The problem with this presupposition of distinctness is that we cannot make sense of the
notion of distinctness without having the notion of unity, which is precisely what we are trying to
account for. So, the orthodox HOT theory of mental unity fails because it presupposes the unity
it is meant to explain.
I offer two responses to Rowlands’s objection. The first is that his objection trades on a conflation
of two notions of unity, and therefore if there is any presupposition of unity at play, it is not an
illegitimate presupposition. The second is that there is in fact no presupposition at all, and a
fortiori, no illegitimate presupposition.
2.1. An Objectively HOT Approach
Consider the contents of a bag. They are unified by the bag in a sense that we can call unity 1.
Contrast this with the threads of your shirt. They are unified by the act of sewing in a sense we
can call unity2. Rowlands’s argument against HOT theories of mental unity conflates these two
notions of unity. He argues that a HOT cannot account for the unity of the members of the Aseries of thoughts without presupposing that the A-series is distinct from the B-series and
therefore that the A-series is unified, which is precisely what is meant to be accounted for. But
the sort of unity presupposed by claiming that a HOT is about the A-series and not about the Bseries is merely the sort of unity involved in distinguishing one set of things from another set of
things. That is a different, much less demanding sort of unity from the unity at stake in the matter
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of personhood. The unity at stake in personhood — mental unity — is a more akin to the unity of
threads and cloth that have been sewn together. The unity at stake in merely distinguishing one
set of things from another set of things is the sort of unity provided by a bag or a box to whatever
its contents are.
If I am right, then a proponent of HOT can appeal to an objective basis, such as being generated
by the same physical structure (e.g., a brain) to unify1 the first order mental states and the
corresponding HOT. Then, they can appeal to the fact that the HOT is about the first-order mental
states to account for the unity2 of the first-order mental states and the HOT. Appealing to the HOT
to provide unity2 of the first-order mental states will not wrongly presuppose unity of those states,
because it merely presupposes unity1, which is established by the common physical structure that
generated the states, whereas unity2 is the phenomenon being accounted for by the appeal to
HOTs.
2.2. Facts vs. Claims
My first response to Rowlands’s objection to the orthodox HOT theory of mental unity assumes
that Rowlands was right in claiming that a presupposition of unity is made by the orthodox view.
I did not contest that a presupposition is made, but rather showed that the presupposition that
Rowlands’s objection trades on is not problematic. Here, I go on to suggest that there is in fact no
presupposition at all, and a fortiori no problematic presupposition.
As quoted above, Rowlands writes, “The claim that [the HOT] is about members of the A series
and not the B series presupposes that A and B series are distinct series of mental states and
processes” (p. 14). But I don’t see this at all; I don’t understand the objection.
We could take Rowlands’s assertion at face value and assume that when he uses the term
“claims,” which he does consistently in the section of his article dealing with this objection, he
really means “claims.”iii But we are concerned with the fact of whether a HOT is about some-orother first-order thoughts, rather than with a claim to that effect. In asserting that HOTs account
for mental unity, the assertion is that, in fact, a given HOT takes as its object various other mental
states. If that fact is true, it serves as the truth-maker for the claim that the HOT is about the other
mental states. Because the fact is logically prior to the claim, and because the HOT theory of
mental unity requires facts, not claims, and because Rowlands’s objection to the HOT theory of
mental unity alleges that the claim presupposes the fact, Rowlands’s objection to HOT theories
of mental unity seems to fail.
3. Concluding Remarks
I have argued that Rowlands’s objection to HOT theories of mental unity fails. It does not follow,
however, that HOT theories of mental unity are correct, or even that they are superior to
Rowlands’s proposed alternative. Indeed, I agree with Rowlands that HOT theories of mental unity
are almost certainly wrong. Consider an entity that intelligently navigates its environment,
experiences sensory perceptions, sensory sensations, and emotions, and has memories of all of
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these things. It stretches credulity beyond breaking to assert that such a being, in the absence of
higher-order thoughts and the capacity for reflective self-awareness, is not a metaphysical person
in the sense of being a subject of a unified mental life.
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